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1. Organic Administration Act of 1897 § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1897) (current version at 16
U.S.C. § 475 (2006)).
2. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOREST SERVICE DECISION MAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 62-67 (1997) [hereinafter GAO FOREST SERVICE DECISION MAKING
FRAMEWORK].
3. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE PROCESS PREDICAMENT: HOW STATUTORY,
REGULATORY, AND ADMINISTRATIVE FACTORS AFFECT NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT 21
(2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/Process-Predicament.pdf
[hereinafter THE PROCESS PREDICAMENT].
4. GAO FOREST SERVICE DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK, supra note 2, at 28-30.
801
COMMENT
Judicial Iron Triangles: The Roadless Rule to
Nowhere—And What Can be Done to Free the Forest
Service’s Rulemaking Process
Introduction
The United States Forest Service has a long history of seeking to manage
the nation’s publicly held forests in accordance with broad, and sometimes
contradictory, congressional goals.  When the Organic Act of 1897 was
passed, which established the national forest system, it included the following
directive that has served as the Forest Service’s mission statement for the last
century:  “No public forest reservation shall be established, except to improve
and protect the forest within . . . or for the purpose of . . .  furnish[ing] a
continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens . . . .”1
Thus, most of the agency’s history has been marked by the struggle to balance
these two competing directives, providing the public access to and use of its
forest lands, while also working to preserve, improve, and protect them.  
Beginning in the 1970s with the emergence of the environmental movement
and the passage of several important pieces of legislation that inaugurated a
slow shift away from resource production and towards conservation on federal
lands, the Forest Service faced increasing difficulty in moderating between
these competing interests.   The situation has been such a challenge in large2
part because of the massive increase in public participation, which is
dominated by stakeholders on both extremes of the environmental spectrum
who find little motivation to compromise, instead choosing to hold the Forest
Service hostage by invoking the threat of litigation.  Consequently, “analysis
paralysis”  has set in within the Forest Service, resulting in constant litigation3
that requires the Forest Service to devote massive resources to defend its rules
and projects in court.   Furthermore, since its active participation in4
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5. For discussion of judicial iron triangles in greater detail see infra Part V.  The term
“judicial iron triangle” appears to have first been used in Jeanne Nienaber Clarke & Kurt
Angersbach, The Federal Four: Change and Continuity in the Bureau of Land Management,
Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, and National Park Service, 1970-2000, in WESTERN
PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 35, 47 (Charles Davis ed., 2001).  This
comment will sometimes use the term “subgovernment” in place of “judicial iron triangle” in
part for the sake of space, but it is also used to reinforce the idea that judicial iron triangles
make policy outside the traditional, elected policy-making bodies.
6. That is, the collusion of administrative agencies, congressional committees, and the
organized interests they regulate.  One of the first formulations of this concept can be found in
GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Random House 1970)
(1966).
7. Clarke & Angersbach, supra note 5, at 47; Martin Nie, Statutory Detail and
Administrative Discretion in Public Lands Governance: Arguments and Alternatives, 19 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 259-60 (2004).
environmental policymaking in the 1970s, Congress has all but withdrawn
itself from the process, especially more recently with the “Republican
Revolution” of 1994, which was avowedly anti-regulation.  Because Congress
was uninterested in doing so, groups began to turn to the courts and the Forest
Service, with whom they began to work together, to create environmental
policy.
This cooperative effort illustrates how so-called “judicial iron triangles”—
that is, federal judges, administrative agencies, and interest groups—
developed within environmental law.   Essentially, two factors must be present5
for a judicial iron triangle to develop and persist.  First, all the parties to the
group must be able to satisfy the needs of the others involved, which requires
each party to the subgovernment to “do their part” for the others involved.
Once this subgovernment begins to shape policy, it is important for the other
political actors acquiesce to its governance.  If the policy produced by the
judicial iron triangle becomes of interest to outsiders, the nonplayers (i.e.,
Congress or the President) may see incentives developing that would
encourage their intervention in the subgovernment.  Yet, so long as others do
not involve themselves, the members of a judicial iron triangle are able to
shape environmental policy according to their own beliefs because there are
few effective review and control mechanisms overseeing the bureaucrats,
judges, and interest groups that are making policy.  In many ways, the judicial
iron triangle varies little (from a theoretical perspective, at least) from the
concept of the traditional iron triangle,  except that the role of congressional6
committees has been replaced with the federal judiciary.7
The result of governance by judicial iron triangles is that the very reforms
intended by Congress to make environmental policymaking an informed, open,
and collaborative process, instead produced the opposite effect.  Agencies are
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8. The phrase “organized environmental interests” is not meant to refer only to those
groups espousing an environmentalist approach to regulation.  It is meant to include all groups,
including pro-development ones, involved in the debate over environmental policymaking.   
9. See BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE (3d ed.
1998) (discussing the challenges to bureaucratic accountability and methods of holding the
bureaucracy to account for their actions in much greater detail than is possible here).
10. Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President at “Roadless” Lands Event
(Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with author).  Author’s note: many of the roadless rule documents cited
in this comment and noted as “on file with author” are available at the Forest Service’s special
roadless rule website available at http://www.roadless.fs.fed.us.  However, by the time of
publication, the links to these documents were changed at least twice.  For this reason, no direct
links are provided, because of the difficulty in keeping the links accurate.
11. Special Areas, Roadless Area Conservation, Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3272 (Jan.
12, 2001).
12. Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area Management, 70 Fed. Reg.
25,654 (May 13, 2005).
faced with ambiguous and sometimes conflicting mandates from Congress,
which create a battleground in the bureaucracy and the courts where organized
environmental interests  uncompromisingly advocate single-minded policies,8
while leaving the general public with no one to hold accountable for the policy
that results from this process.9
To illustrate the crisis now facing the nation’s environmental policy, this
comment will take a case study approach to examine “one of the largest land
preservation efforts in America’s history,”  President Bill Clinton’s Roadless10
Area Conservation Rule (the roadless rule),  and also President George W.11
Bush’s subsequent (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to revise it (the
state petitions rule).   The process by which the rule was promulgated, and its12
history following publication of the final rule, illustrates the problems
affecting American environmental policymaking today—inefficiency,
paralysis, polarization, and a general lack of accountability.
Part I of this comment will provide a brief history of the Forest Service’s
management of roadless areas, focusing on the promulgation of the roadless
rule and the state petitions rule.  In keeping with the theme of judicial iron
triangles, the majority of the analysis throughout this comment focuses on the
relationships in this tripartite arrangement during the rulemaking process, and
the consequences of these relationships.  Part II will look at the interaction of
organized interests and the courts.  Part III will turn toward the interaction
between organized interests and the Forest Service.  Part IV will focus on the
courts and the Forest Service.  Part V will address the origins of the judicial
iron triangle phenomenon in environmental law.  Part VI will then explore
reforms that could produce a more efficient, cooperative, and accountable
rulemaking process.  This comment concludes in Part VII.
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13. See Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning,
45 OR. L. REV. 288 (1966).
14. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006).
15. Id. § 1132.  In essence, the Secretary of Agriculture reviews potential wilderness areas
and then gives a report to the President on which lands are appropriate for wilderness
designation.  Id.  The President then reviews the recommendations and passes them along to
Congress.  Id.
16. Id. § 1131(a), (c).
17. See id. § 1132(b) (requiring the Forest Service to take this action).  For a thorough
overview of the RARE I & II processes, see Charles F. Wilkinson &  Michael H. Anderson,
Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 334-70 (1985). 
18. Roadless and Undeveloped Areas within National Forests; Selection of New Study
Areas, Availability of Final Environmental Statement, 38 Fed. Reg. 28894-95 (Oct. 15, 1973);
see also FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ROADLESS AND UNDEVELOPED AREAS: FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: SELECTION OF FINAL NEW STUDY AREAS FROM ROADLESS AND
UNDEVELOPED AREAS WITHIN THE NATIONAL FORESTS (1973) [hereinafter ROADLESS AND
UNDEVELOPED AREAS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT].
19. ROADLESS AND UNDEVELOPED AREAS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra note
18.
20. Wyo. Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); see also
Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
I. A Brief History of Forest Service Protection of Roadless Areas
A. Initial Attempts
As the environmental movement began hitting its stride in the 1960s and
1970s, the federal government was pressured to provide some kind of
protection to the untouched lands under its control.   This pressure culminated13
in the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964 (Wilderness Act).   The14
Wilderness Act established a procedure by which Congress could designate
roadless areas as “wilderness,”  which had the effect of keeping them in a15
primitive state in perpetuity.   In 1967, the Forest Service began its first16
attempt to inventory (known as the Roadless Areas Review and Evaluation or
RARE I) all of the roadless areas within the national forest system with the
goal of ultimately recommending some of the land to Congress as appropriate
for wilderness designation.   In 1973, the process ended with a finding that17
approximately 56 million acres of roadless areas existed within the national
forest system.   Of these acres, approximately 12.3 million were designated18
as suitable to be categorized wilderness.   In 1972, while the RARE I process19
was still underway, the courts considered several successful challenges,
brought under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), to the
wilderness designation process used by the Forest Service.   The issues raised20
in these challenges, which primarily complained that the NEPA process was
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21. See Martin Nie, Administrative Rulemaking and Public Lands Conflict: The Forest
Service’s Roadless Rule, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 687, 698 n.62 (2004).  As Nie notes, in the
RARE I and II cases, it was conservation, not development interests, complaining about the
NEPA process.  Id.
22. See ROADLESS AND UNDEVELOPED AREAS: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, supra
note 18.
23. JOHN FEDKIW, MANAGING MULTIPLE USES ON NATIONAL FORESTS, 1905-1995, at 114-
15 (1996).
24. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 17, at 348.  The two acts were the Eastern
Wilderness Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2096 (1975), and the Endangered
American Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-200, 91 Stat. 1425 (1978).
25. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 17, at 348.  
26. FEDKIW, supra note 23, at 114. 
27. Id. at 115. 
28. Id.; see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 17, at 349-50.
29. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., RARE II: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, ROADLESS AREA REVIEW AND EVALUATION iii (1979) [hereinafter RARE II: FINAL
EIS].  For a through discussion of the RARE II processes and subsequent litigation, see Douglas
E. Booth, Timber Dependency and Wilderness Selection: The U.S. Forest Service, Congress,
and the RARE II Decisions, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 715 (1991). 
rushed and the analysis produced was deficient, are strikingly similar to those
that would be brought against the roadless rule nearly 30 years later.21
After the RARE I decisions, the Forest Service made various attempts to fix
the problems with the RARE I process and analysis.  The major fix was
supposed to be the publication of the final environmental impact statement for
the inventory of roadless areas in 1973, as discussed above.   However,22
conservationist groups and Congress remained displeased, claiming that the
Forest Service was being too picky in recommending lands for wilderness
designation through its policy of requiring potential wilderness lands to be in
pristine condition and untrammeled by man.   As a result, Congress passed23
two laws that created wilderness in the eastern and western United States,24
some of which the Forest Service claimed was inappropriate for such
designation.   With time, however, Forest Service officials came to the25
realization that RARE I was the product of a flawed NEPA analysis, as it did
not fully meet the Act’s requirements.   With the inauguration of the Carter26
administration and the appointment of new officials within the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the catalyst was in place for a second
attempt at a roadless area review.27
In 1977, the Forest Service began its second attempt at inventorying the
roadless areas within its jurisdiction (RARE II).   RARE II was completed in28
1979, and the inventory identified 62 million acres as roadless areas within the
national forest system.   Because the Forest Service used a more liberal29
standard than that used previously in RARE I, it recommended to Congress
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30. RARE II: FINAL EIS, supra note 29, at iii-viii.
31. California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982).
32. As a part of the process of creating land management plans for each national forest, the
Forest Service considers recommendations of wilderness, but only on a forest-by-forest basis,
as required by the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1600-1614 (2006).
33. Brandon Dalling, Administrative Wilderness: Protecting Our National Forestlands in
Contravention of Congressional Intent and Public Policy, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 393
(2002). 
34. E.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat.
2371 (1980); California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (1984);
Oregon Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-328, 98 Stat. 272 (1984); Washington State
Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-339, 98 Stat. 299 (1984).
35. 1 FOREST SERV., U. S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1-5 (2000). 
36. Administration of the Forest Development Transportation System: Temporary
Suspension of Road Construction and Reconstruction in Unroaded Areas, 64 Fed. Reg. 7290,
7303 (Feb. 12, 1999).  It is important to note that the Tongass National Forest was exempt from
the interim rule, as it had recently completed its Forest Plan, and as a result of the plan the local
economy was in a state of massive transition due to drastically reduced timber harvest levels.
Id. at 7300.  It was feared that including the Tongass would result in an economic catastrophe
for the 80,000 people living in and around the Tongass National Forest, who to that point had
15.1 million acres as appropriate for wilderness designation.   Again, in 1982,30
a successful NEPA challenge to the Forest Service’s wilderness designation
procedure, California v. Block, put a halt to any action being taken on the
inventory.   Block had the effect of halting any attempts to develop roadless31
areas identified in RARE II without additional analysis.  This was the last
attempt by the Forest Service to recommend any additions to the wilderness
system, at least on a nationwide scale.   In response to Block, the Forest32
Service initially contemplated doing a RARE III analysis, but eventually
scrapped the proposal.   By the mid 1980s, as it became clear that RARE III33
would not be conducted, Congress had effectively taken control of roadless
area policy by enacting numerous bills that created wilderness areas on a state-
by-state basis.34
B. President Clinton Acts—The Roadless Area Conservation Rule
The next major step toward a nationwide rule protecting roadless areas
within the national forest system began in early 1998.  At that time, a survey
revealed that the Forest Service faced an $8.4 billion backlog of road
maintenance and construction.   Acting on a promise made during his35
confirmation hearings to improve the agency’s fiscal responsibility, Mike
Dombeck, Forest Service Chief, initiated the rulemaking process, and in
February 1999 published what was known as the “Interim Roadless Rule,”36
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/4
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largely depended on timber for economic stability in their communities.  Id.
37. Id.  Challenges to the interim rule were unsuccessful.  See Wyo. Timber Indus. Ass’n
v. U.S. Forest Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Wyo. 2000).
38. See National Forest System Roadless Areas, Notice of Intent to Prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,306 (Oct. 19, 1999).
39. Memorandum from Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., to the Sec’y of Agric.,
Protection of Forest “Roadless” Areas (Oct. 13, 1999) (on file with author).
40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-553 (2006).
41. National Environmental Policy Act § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2006).
42. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 3248 (Jan.
12, 2001).
43. Id. at 3272.
44. For a discussion of the roadless rule’s relation to the Tongass National Forest and the
various legal issues raised, see generally Jennifer L. Sullivan, The Spirit of 76: Does President
Clinton’s Roadless Lands Directive Violate the Spirit of the National Forest Management Act
of 1976?, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 127 (2000).
45. Memorandum for the Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).  For a general discussion of the different approaches towards
roadless area management taken by Clinton and Bush, see Robert L. Glicksman, Traveling in
Opposite Directions: Roadless Area Management Under the Clinton and Bush Administrations,
34 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2004).
which placed an eighteen month moratorium on road building in national
forest roadless areas.   In the meantime, agency officials began to work on a37
permanent rule.   President Clinton, in a memorandum to the Secretary of38
Agriculture, directed the Forest Service to “provide appropriate long-term
protection for most or all” roadless areas.39
The Forest Service’s rulemaking process, as set forth by the Administrative
Procedures Act  and NEPA,  required a number of periods of public40 41
participation.  Four hundred thirty public meetings were held and over 1.6
million public comments were received, though 95 percent of the public
comments came in the form of letters or postcards.   The final rule prohibited42
all road construction within “inventoried roadless areas,” with a few
exceptions, most importantly “to protect public health and safety in cases of
an imminent threat of flood, fire, or other catastrophic event that, without
intervention, would cause the loss of life or property.”   The final rule applied43
to 58.5 million acres of national forest land, which is equal to two percent of
the United States’ land mass (including the Tongass National Forest, which
had been excluded from the interim rule).44
C. The Roadless Rule Goes To Court
Shortly after coming to office, President George W. Bush issued what is
now known as the “Card Memo,” which postponed all rules promulgated by
the previous administration, but not yet in effect, for sixty days.   The roadless45
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46. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1235 (D. Idaho 2001).
47. Idaho v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV99-611-N-EJL, 2000 WL 33417326 (D. Idaho Feb.
18, 2000).
48. For an up-to-date chronology of the roadless rule, see Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., Roadless-Home, http://roadless.fs.fed.us/ (last visited May 20, 2009).
49. Idaho ex rel. Kempthorne v. U.S. Forest Serv., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (D. Idaho 2001);
Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231.
50. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002).  The Ninth Circuit
combined the two district court cases into a single case, as they were both addressing identical
issues.  
51. Wyoming v. USDA, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Wyo. 2003), vacated as moot, 414 F.3d
1207 (10th Cir. 2005).
52. FOREST SERV., RELEASE NO. 0200.03, U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC., USDA RETAINS
NATIONAL FORESTS ROADLESS AREA CONSERVATION RULE, (June 9, 2003) (on file with
author).
53. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the Tongass National
Forest, Alaska, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136 (Dec. 30, 2003).
rule was to take effect on March 13, 2001, and thus, was one of the regulations
directly affected by the memo.  Despite the Bush administration’s
postponement, parties upset by the roadless rule filed legal challenges to it
before the final rule was even published in the Federal Register.   The State46
of Idaho brought suit in 1999, claiming that the Forest Service’s scoping
process was in violation of NEPA, but the suit was dismissed as not ripe for
judicial review because no final agency action had been taken at that time.47
By early 2006, nine cases had been filed challenging the roadless rule in six
different federal district courts.   On May 10, 2001, a district court judge in48
Idaho granted injunctions against the roadless rule in two separate cases, Idaho
v. United States Forest Service and Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman.   A49
three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
subsequently vacated the injunctions, holding that the district court had abused
its discretion in enjoining the rule.   In July 2003 in Wyoming v. USDA, a50
district court judge enjoined the application of the rule nationwide, finding that
the Forest Service had violated NEPA on several counts during the rulemaking
process and, additionally, violated the Wilderness Act.   Concurrently, a51
separate settlement was reached with the State of Alaska which resolved that
state’s legal challenge to the rule.   The terms of the settlement required the52
Forest Service to propose, and ultimately promulgate, a new rule temporarily
exempting the Tongass National Forest from the roadless rule.53
D. President Bush Reacts—The State Petitions Rule
Meanwhile, the Bush administration, along with the Forest Service, was
actively working toward addressing the issues raised in criticism of the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/4
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54. Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried
Roadless Area Management; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25654-62 (May 13, 2005).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Wyoming v. USDA, 414 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2005).
58. Id. at 1213-14.
59. California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, 459 F. Supp. 2d 874 (N.D. Cal 2006).
60. Categorical Exclusion, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.4(p), 1500.5(k), 1508.4 (2007).
61. Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 894-909.
62. Id. at 894; see also Special Areas; State Petitions for Inventoried Roadless Area
Management; Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,653, at 25,660 (May 13, 2005).
63. Lockyer, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 915-16.
64. Id. at 913-19.
original roadless rule.  This process eventually spawned a new rule, the state
petitions rule, in May 2005.   The new rule created a process by which state54
governors could petition the Secretary of Agriculture to initiate the rulemaking
process for the purpose of managing roadless areas within their state.   This55
state-specific process came in response to the most widespread criticism of the
original roadless rule—that it imposed an inflexible national standard unable
to accommodate the issues that necessarily arise in managing disparate
national forests.   The new rule had the effect of rendering all pending legal56
challenges to the roadless rule moot.   Thus, because the objectionable57
portions of the original rule were removed, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit vacated the Wyoming district court’s 2003 injunction.58
E. The Roadless Rule Revived
The story of the roadless rule and state petitions rule, however, did not end
with the Tenth Circuit’s decision.  In 2005, in California ex rel. Lockyer v.
USDA, the State of California alleged that the state petitions rule violated
several environmental laws, most notably NEPA.   When the case was59
decided in October 2006, the district court found that the Forest Service
violated NEPA, determining that the state petitions rule fell within the
categorical exclusion  to NEPA’s environmental impact requirement.   The60 61
Forest Service had applied the categorical exclusion to the state petitions rule
and, thus, did not prepare an environmental impact statement because the
agency felt that the rule was “purely procedural.”   The court held that, in fact,62
the state petitions rule was a major federal action significantly affecting the
environment because it replaced nationwide protection for roadless areas with
a different system.   As a result, the court issued an injunction against63
implementation of the state petitions rule.   However, the court went a step64
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65. Id.
66. Id. at 919.
67. Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment, Wyoming v. USDA, Civ. No. 01-CV-
086B, (D. Wyo. Sept. 22, 2006).
68. Order Denying State of Wyoming’s Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), Wyoming v. USDA, Civ. No. 01-CV-086B
(D. Wyo. June 7, 2007).
69. Bob Moen, Wyoming’s Roadless Rule Challenge Back in Court, CASPER STAR TRIB.,
Oct. 20, 2007, at A3.
70. Wyoming v. USDA, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (D. Wyo. 2008).  As this comment was
being prepared for publication, not surprisingly, major developments took place.  First, in light
of Judge Brimmer’s August 2008 decision, Judge Laporte reconsidered her decision in Lockyer
and issued a stay of her earlier injunction against the state petitions rule.  See Order Partially
Staying Injunctive Relief in the Interests of Comity Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
62(c), California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, Civ. No. C05-03508, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2008)
(lifting the injunction as to all National Forests outside of the Ninth Circuit).  Next, the new
Obama administration, in an effort to rectify some of the confusion arising from all the
litigation, issued an interim directive allowing limited road building upon the Secretary of
Agriculture’s approval.  See Memorandum from Tom Vilsack, Sec’y of Agric., Authority to
Approve Road Construction and Timber Harvesting in Certain Lands Administered by the
Forest Service (May 28, 2009) (on file with author).  Not surprisingly, Judge Brimmer on June
15, 2009, refused to reconsider his August 2008 injunction, in light of the Obama
administration’s  new directive.  See Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration and Rule 62(c)
Motion for Suspension of Injunction Pending Appeal, Wyoming v. USDA, Civ. No. 07-CV-
017B (D. Wyo. June 15, 2009).  Finally, in August 2009, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision
on the Lockyer appeal, upholding Judge Laporte’s decision to enjoin the state petitions rule and
reinstate the roadless rule.  See California ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, No. 07-15613, 2009 WL
further and found that because the 2003 injunction against the roadless rule
had been vacated, the roadless rule was, in effect, reinstated.65
F. The Never Ending Road?
Just as it appeared that a point of time had been reached in which the
roadless rule was revived and was afforded an opportunity to permanently
become a part of the law, the rule found itself back in court.  This was
foreshadowed to some degree in Lockyer, where the defendants counseled the
magistrate judge against reinstating the rule because to do so would lead to
massive litigation.   Accordingly, just days after Lockyer was decided, the66
State of Wyoming filed a motion for relief from the Lockyer decision in the
district court in Wyoming.   Initially, Judge Brimmer denied the request and67
instead advised the State to ask the Tenth Circuit to reconsider its 2005
decision vacating Brimmer’s 2003 decision enjoining the rule.   After the68
Tenth Circuit refused to do so, Wyoming filed suit in Brimmer’s court, once
more challenging the roadless rule.   In August 2008, Judge Brimmer again69
enjoined the roadless rule.  70
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2386403 (9th Cir. Aug. 5, 2009).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e)(2006); see also 7 C.F.R. § 1.28 (2007).
72. Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the National Forests in
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In yet another twist on the roadless rule saga, the State of Idaho, and later
the State of Colorado, took a slightly different approach to that considered by
the state petitions rule.  Because that rule had been invalidated by Lockyer,
these states petitioned the Secretary of Agriculture to initiate state specific
rulemaking under the Administrative Procedures Act section 553(e), which
allows any “interested person the right to petition [an agency] for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.”   Idaho’s petition was published as a71
proposed rule in the Federal Register in January 2008.   Because the petition72
was not issued under the state petition rule, it has escaped the litigation that
has plagued the other rules.
II. Courts, Interest Groups, and the Roadless Rule
The development of the roadless rule and state petitions rule provide ample
evidence of the existence of a new kind of iron triangle present in American
environmental policymaking.  This section will examine the use of courts by
those feeling wronged by the Forest Service decision-making process and how
suits seeking to enforce environmental statutes have becomes just another tool
in the repertoire of interest groups on both sides of the environmental policy
debate.  In addition, this section will discuss the role of judges as policymakers
and the potential for politics to affect judicial decision making in the roadless
rule cases.  
Over the last forty years or so, federal judges and interest groups have
developed a mutually beneficial relationship in the realm of environmental
policymaking.  The federal judiciary has developed into a forum for groups
who feel ignored or trivialized in the more traditional policymaking
processes.   In particular, federal judges have expanded the concept of73
standing to allow groups greater access to the courts,  NEPA violations have74
been recognized as presenting viable causes of action,  and intervention has75
been liberally granted in environmental cases.   In return, interest groups have76
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provided the judiciary two easily identifiable benefits—they provide
information and legal analysis (both as parties and as amici), and they bring
cases to the courts that require judges to decide between competing policy
preferences and to justify their decisions, which then creates the opportunity
for judges to express their political preferences.
A. Benefits Provided to Courts by Interest Groups—Opportunity and
Information
Judges have been traditionally thought of as impartial, apolitical
decisionmakers who “base their decisions on precedent and will adhere to the
doctrine of stare decisis.”   Under this view, often referred to as the legal77
model of judicial decision making, organized interest groups would have little
influence on judicial decision making because decisions would be highly
constrained by precedent and judicial iron triangles could not develop.   An78
opposing view, known as the attitudinal model, holds that judges do make
decisions on the basis of something other than precedent.   In an oft-quoted79
passage from Cardozo’s classic work, The Nature of the Judicial Process, he
noted that “[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not
turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.”   Those holding this view80
believe that each judge’s personal policy preferences predominate, with
disagreement arising over whether those policy positions are ever modified in
light of the likely response of other policymakers.81
According to some, judges are strategic actors who render decisions with
the goal of seeing their positions becoming policy.   Thus, judges have an82
incentive to decide cases in accordance with the position of the most powerful
or influential party or group—if their decisions are challenged later in other
political arenas, it is likely that the more powerful group will prevail.83
Deciding in this manner, then, supports the idea of judicial iron
triangles—judges decide cases according to their own policy preference, with
a view towards seeing their decisions becoming effective policy.  Judges,
however, depend on interest groups to bring the appropriate cases before their
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol61/iss4/4
2008] COMMENT 813
84. KENNETH J. MEIER, POLITICS AND THE BUREAUCRACY 140-43 (4th ed. 2000)
(discussing the impact of lack of expertise among federal judges).
85. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 79, at 781-85.
86. Clement E. Vose, Litigation as a Form of Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 20, 22-23 (1958) (discussing the NAACP’s use of litigation to affect
policy change).
87. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 34 (1982) (suggesting that collective action is likely
where a small number of “zealots” together value a certain collective good at a level equal to
or greater than a larger group of individuals (in the case of the environment, the larger group
would be the public in general)).
88. Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-559, 701-706 (2006). 
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courts and also rely, to some degree, on these groups to provide the
information and rationale necessary to reach a defensible decision.   To some84
extent, by bringing cases, the groups also implicitly promise to support a
favorable decision elsewhere in the policymaking process.  Interest groups, on
the other hand, receive from the courts an open forum they might not find
anywhere else.
The primary benefit provided to courts (and thus, judges) by interest groups
is the opportunity to consider an issue, which then, according to the attitudinal
model, would create the opportunity for judges to carry out their political
preferences.   Because federal courts lack any power to actively solicit cases85
on their own, courts would be nonentities in environmental policy without
interest groups, or at least, their role would be dramatically reduced.  While
individual citizens could still bring suit on their own, they often lack the
resources (time and money) to do so.   In this way, interest groups function86
like a kind of environmental insurance; like-minded people pool their
resources together with the goal of distributing the burdens of litigation among
themselves, which enables the members of the groups to collectively challenge
or defend a greater number of projects than they could individually.87
However, since groups exist on both sides of the environmental debate,
environmental cases require judges to decide between two positions that are
seemingly consistent with the law.  This, then, provides judges with the
opportunity to decide cases according to political preference.
In the roadless rule cases, the fundamental issue presented to the courts was
whether the roadless rule was promulgated in violation of the procedural
requirements established under NEPA and the Administrative Procedures Act
of 1946 (APA).   Suits alleging NEPA violations must be brought under the88
APA because NEPA does not have any provision for judicial review of agency
decisions in violation of its provisions.   Section 702 of the APA entitles any89
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“person suffering legal wrong because of agency” to judicial review of such
action.   Under the APA, agency actions must be set aside if they are found90
to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law”  and also where agency actions are found to be “without91
observance of procedure required by law.”92
To briefly summarize, the plaintiffs in the roadless rule cases argued that the
Forest Service violated the requirements of NEPA on several counts: the
agency did not allow enough time for the public to meaningfully participate,93
it failed to consider a full range of alternatives in the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) process,  and inexplicably failed to grant the most affected94
states participation in the process by granting cooperating agency status.   The95
plaintiffs also alleged that the Forest Service violated several other laws, most
importantly the Wilderness Act.   The Wilderness Act violations consisted96
mainly of accusations that the Forest Service, through the roadless rule,
created de facto wilderness areas, a power that Congress specifically reserved
for itself in the Wilderness Act.   In Wyoming v. USDA,  the Forest Service97 98
was also accused of violating the National Forest Management Act and the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act among others, but the district judge did not
consider it necessary to consider these in light of the violations of NEPA and
the Wilderness Act.   It should be noted that the plaintiffs in Kootenai Tribe99
of Idaho v. Veneman  and Idaho ex rel. Kempthorne v. U.S. Forest Service100 101
(the other roadless rule cases in which decisions have been reached) made
similar arguments.102
Considering that the substance of the arguments presented at both the trial
and appellate levels were generally the same (the rule was/was not rushed
through, the alternatives considered in the EIS were/were not sufficient), why
did the district judges in Kootenai and Wyoming enjoin the roadless rule (as
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the dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit panel would have done as well )103
while the Ninth Circuit supported the rule?  The answer to this question is
apparent by looking for evidence of a judicial iron triangle.  The judges at each
level were voting with their own political preferences in mind, and the interest
groups bringing and defending the rule provided them the rationale and
opportunity to do so, while receiving in return an open forum from the court.
Although the sample is not large enough to make sweeping generalizations
about environmental policy, the most common and accurate indicator of how
a judge would rule in a roadless rule case was the political party of the
president who nominated him or her.  Judges nominated by Republican
presidents ruled against the roadless rule, whereas the two Ninth Circuit judges
voting to uphold it were both appointed by President Clinton.   Additional104
support for finding politically motivated decision making comes from the
language in the judges’ opinions, which becomes particularly evident when
comparing the Kootenai decision with the decision in Wyoming.105
Analysis of the Kootenai decision reveals the majority’s view of the
roadless rule and the environmental philosophy underlying it.  The most telling
example is found in footnote 30 of the majority opinion in which the judges
asserted that the court had to consider the fact that endangered wildlife found
refuge in roadless areas.   The judges’ demand for consideration of106
endangered wildlife illustrates that political philosophy, and not precedent,
guided their decision.  NEPA makes no express mention of wildlife anywhere
within the text of the Act, though there is one regulation that states that “[the]
degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or threatened
species or its habitat”  is one factor that should be considered when107
determining if the action is “significant[].”   If an action is deemed to have108
a significant effect on the environment, an environmental impact statement is
then required.   Instead, NEPA’s policy goals are expressed in terms of109
humans’ relationship with the environment; for example, Congress intended
that NEPA would protect the environment for the “overall welfare and
development of man” and to “fulfill the social, economic, and other
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requirements of present and future . . . Americans.”   That is not to say that110
animals do not form part of the “environment”; rather, there is no language in
NEPA requiring a consideration of such factors in arriving at a decision to act.
The Kootenai majority overturned the district court’s injunction based on what
they alleged were NEPA’s policy goals,  finding that the roadless rule111
furthered the substantive goals of the Act.  This position is also inconsistent
with precedent holding that NEPA’s substantive policy is not legally
enforceable.  In 1978, the United States Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council held that while
“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation . . . its
mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural.”   This position has been112
consistently reinforced by courts in later decisions.113
Additionally, the majority asserted in defense of its ruling that the “NEPA
alternatives requirement [part of the EIS process] must be interpreted less
stringently when the proposed agency action has a primary and central purpose
to conserve and protect the natural environment.”   This amounts to a holding114
that it is acceptable for an agency to violate the procedural requirements of the
NEPA so long as the substance of the action is pro-environment.  In response
to the majority’s ruling, the dissenting judge noted that there is no precedent
for this interpretation of NEPA.   Along similar lines, the majority also115
chastised the lower court for “[not] giving due weight to the public’s interest
in conservation of natural resources”  in issuing the injunction—which could116
be interpreted as arguing that because the decision was not environmentally
friendly, it is invalid.  In doing so, the majority essentially rejected the explicit
findings by the district court that the roadless rule would prevent irreparable
harm to the plaintiffs by preventing Forest Service officials from actively
managing national forests to prevent fires.   Instead, the majority claims this117
argument is “overstated” and notes that there could be “no serious argument”
that the roadless rule would not provide “immeasurable benefits from a
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conservationist standpoint.”   The majority cites no authority for balancing118
the hardships for the purpose of granting a preliminary injunction from a
“conservationist standpoint.”  In fact, the majority seems to assume that
because the roadless rule would prevent trees from being cut down and roads
from being constructed, it will necessarily conserve and protect the
environment.119
Separating NEPA’s procedural requirements from any substantive goals it
may have plays an important role in the relationship between courts and the
other branches of government.   If courts were required to consider how well120
a proposed rule fits NEPA’s substantive goals, judges would be forced to make
value-laden, politically motivated decisions.  For instance, how is a judge to
determine whether or not an agency action “fulfill[s] the responsibilities of
each generation as trustee of the environment,”  or whether a rule121
“encourage[s] productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment?”   These are the kind of substantive goals found in NEPA, and,122
as is apparent, it would be impossible for them to be uniformly interpreted and
enforced across the country because these goals are understood differently by
different individuals.  Divorcing the procedure from the substance plays an
important role in ensuring NEPA will be interpreted similarly throughout the
country.
Judge Brimmer’s district court opinion in Wyoming differs in more than its
conclusion.  The first thing that strikes the reader about the opinion is the
greater amount of documentary evidence that was available to and utilized by
Brimmer in issuing his ruling.   The administrative record of the case was full123
of internal documents that suggested that the Forest Service intentionally and
arbitrarily rushed the rulemaking process in order to keep to the timeline
imposed by President Clinton and Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck.   The124
result is that Brimmer’s conclusions appear more defensible than some of
those reached by the Kootenai majority; but, that is not to say that he was free
from politically motivated decision making. 
Judge Brimmer makes no attempt to hide his disdain for the Ninth Circuit’s
Kootenai decision.  In a lengthy footnote, he calls the decision “judicial gloss”
and, therefore, “refrain[s] from relying on any Ninth Circuit NEPA opinions
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as persuasive authority.”   Similarly, in his opinion’s first sentence, Brimmer125
states that the issue before the court is the legality of the roadless rule, which
the Forest Service “drove through the administrative process in a vehicle
smelling of political prestidigitation.”   Brimmer further accuses the agency126
of losing sight of its mission while attempting to “create a ‘legacy’ for itself
and the Clinton administration through the Roadless Rule.”127
Brimmer’s display of political disgust with the Forest Service’s actions was
not necessary to the resolution of the case.  His colleagues in the District of
Idaho did not need to resort to political bickering to resolve essentially the
same arguments.   However, it does suggest that federal judges can and will128
use their opinions to shape the public debate on controversial issues.  It is
doubtful that the judges involved were oblivious to the fact that a decision like
Kootenai or Wyoming would receive substantial press coverage or that their
words would form the basis of news reports on the decisions.   Furthermore,129
newspapers reporting on the roadless rule cases did not always rely on the
legally operative portions of the decisions but instead chose quotes from dicta
in the opinions.  For example, in reporting on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Kootenai, The Oregonian quoted some of the troubling language in the
majority’s opinion—that there could be “no serious argument” on the roadless
rule’s “benefits from a conservationist standpoint.”   This illustrates one of130
the less recognized benefits interest groups receive in going to court, as issues
that might otherwise be ignored and groups that might remain unknown are
brought to the spotlight, regardless of their success.  This publicity then can be
translated into influence on the other branches of government.131
As mentioned above, judges also rely, to some degree, on interest groups
to provide them with highly technical information and to present legal
arguments.  The most traditional manner in which groups do so (other than by
bringing cases) is to submit amicus curiae briefs.   This form of participation132
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140. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (summarizing
has grown exponentially in the past fifty years.   At the United States133
Supreme Court level, the number of filings by amici has risen by more than
800 percent, while the caseload has remained relatively static.   This trend is134
reflected in the roadless rule cases.  For example, by the time the Wyoming
decision reached the Tenth Circuit, twelve amicus curiae briefs had been
submitted on behalf of twenty-one different groups.   Despite the prevalence135
of this form of participation, most attempts to quantitatively gauge the
influence of amici briefs on judicial decision making generally have produced
inconclusive results.   However, as the roadless rule cases suggest, they do136
seem to be used by judges as sources of information and reasoning to support
their decisions.  For example, the Ninth Circuit majority in Kootenai used the
reasoning found in the amicus brief of Montana’s Attorney General to support
its argument that the roadless rule’s public participation process was
sufficient—or in the Attorney General’s words, “exemplary.”137
B. Benefits Provided to Interest Groups by the Courts—The Keys to the
Courthouse Door
While judges obviously play a central role in environmental policymaking,
without interest groups, courts would be almost irrelevant because they lack
any power to bring suits on their own.  Perhaps the greatest benefit judges
confer on environmental interest groups is permitting them to bring suit, which
judges do by applying standing requirements more or less stringently
(depending on the issues in the case), recognizing valid causes of action for
violations of environmental statutes that do not contain express citizen suit
provisions (especially NEPA), and liberally granting environmental interest
groups status as interveners.138
Standing is the basis for all cases brought in the federal court system.   It139
is generally derived from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the
jurisdiction of federal courts to cases and controversies; it is considered one
element of this limit.   The case or controversy limitation is meant to ensure140
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that the federal courts only hear true disputes—not hypothetical situations or
cases where all matters in question have already been resolved (e.g., moot
cases).   In modern times, the law of standing has developed greatly in the141
realm of environmental litigation, as courts utilize standing rules to either open
or close the door to environmental interest groups.   The first step towards142
expanding the concept of standing in environmental cases (particularly in the
context of a private citizen seeking to enforce federal statutes) came with the
1966 United States Court of Appeals case Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. Federal Power Commission.   In Scenic Hudson, the Second143
Circuit recognized that to have standing the harm a party must suffer can be
more than a personal economic interest.   There, the court recognized that the144
plaintiffs had standing to bring suit based on the aesthetic harms they allegedly
suffered.145
The first United States Supreme Court case to address a similar issue was
Sierra Club v. Morton,  decided in 1972.  Morton was decided along similar146
lines as Scenic Hudson in that the Supreme Court rejected the position that
only economic harm was sufficient to bring suit under the APA, noting that
injury to “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational” values can also amount
to legally cognizable damage, sufficient to find an actual case or
controversy.   The United States Supreme Court expanded citizen standing147
even further in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (commonly known as SCRAP).   In SCRAP, the Court148
maintained the requirement that a plaintiff must allege harm, but the decision
seemed to allow an indirect link between that harm and the agency action.149
Standing law was further refined with the appointment to the United States
Supreme Court of Justice Scalia, a long time critic of expansive grants of
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standing in citizen enforcement cases.   His influence over standing law150
reached its apex in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.   In Lujan, the three-part151
test for standing that had developed over the previous years was reaffirmed:
(1) the plaintiff must suffer a legally cognizable “‘injury in fact’ . . . which is
(a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or imminent’, not
conjectural or hypothetical”; (2) there must be a “causal connection between
the injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) it must be “likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”   What was remarkable about Lujan is that it held that the violation152
of the public interest by the federal government itself was not a sufficient harm
to support standing, even where, as in Lujan, Congress had specifically
provided a citizen suit provision in the relevant statute (the Endangered
Species Act).153
Finally, conservationists received a favorable standing decision in 2000
when the United States Supreme Court decided Friends of the Earth v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc.   The majority opinion, written by154
Justice Ginsburg (over the fervent dissent by Justice Scalia) explained that the
harm necessary for standing (in environmental cases) is not solely harm to the
environment, but rather, harm to the plaintiff.   Furthermore, Justice155
Ginsburg’s opinion reiterated that aesthetic harm is sufficient for standing’s
sake.   The decision also held that, under the particular facts of the case,156
citizen attempts to require that civil penalties be paid by the defendant were
sufficient to support the redressability requirement of standing, despite the fact
that such fines are paid to directly to the government and not the plaintiff.157
Ginsburg reasoned that civil penalties would have a deterrent effect on the
questioned behavior and tend to assure that the wrongful activities will not be
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permissive intervention when (1) a statute confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
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168. Appel, supra note 76 (generally discussing the historical development of intervention
continued.  In this way, citizens can receive redressability from civil
penalties.158
In the roadless rule cases, the plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit was not a
significant issue, though it was contested.  The courts mechanically applied the
Lujan test and easily found its requirements to be satisfied.   In the NEPA159
context, a plaintiff must show that the “procedures in question are designed to
protect some threatened concrete interest,”  which is accomplished by160
demonstrating a “geographic nexus between their NEPA claims and the land
allegedly suffering an environmental impact.”   For example, the harm the161
Kootenai tribe suffered could not have come from a NEPA violation alone to
support a claim of standing.   Rather, the tribe owned land adjacent to162
national forests and they alleged the roadless rule would lead to wildfires and
insect infestations.   The State of Wyoming made similar claims in its suit.163 164
In contrast, and perhaps more troubling, however, is the liberal granting of
status as defendant-interveners to several interest groups (nine in Kootenai165
and eight in Wyoming ) in the roadless rule cases under Federal Rule of Civil166
Procedure 24, which, to some extent, is tied to the concept of standing.167
Intervention by interest groups is not necessarily troublesome, particularly
when groups intervene on behalf of a plaintiff presenting, for example, a
NEPA challenge to an agency rule.  Intervention is thought to assist the
administration of justice by allowing individuals, not a party to the original
case, to intervene where the outcome of the case may affect their rights or
where their participation may assist in the resolution of the case.   Courts168
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175. Monarch Chem. Works, Inc. v. Exon, 452 F. Supp. 493, 501-02 (D. Neb. 1978).
176. Kootenai, 313 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)).
tend to disagree on the status of intervenors, whether they are full parties with
all the rights and obligations that come with such status, or whether they are
something less.   This question is particularly troubling when the original169
party, with whom the intervenor is aligned, declines to appeal an unfavorable
ruling.170
The trouble arises when, as in the roadless rule cases, groups are granted
status as defendant-interveners in a NEPA challenge, and the original
defendant is the federal government.  After an unfavorable ruling, the
government then chooses not to appeal.  As the Ninth Circuit noted, this is an
“unusual procedural setting.”   From a constitutional perspective, this raises171
a separation of powers question under the Constitution’s Article II, which
requires the Executive to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”172
In this example, the courts are forcing a rule upon the executive branch that the
administrative agency responsible for it admits is problematic and is actively
working to change.  However, if the roadless rule was required to be
implemented either by statute or through the Constitution, and the federal
government refused to defend it, then the interveners could legally appeal the
case.173
Furthermore, the roadless rule cases were inappropriate for intervention
because the statute that had been violated, NEPA, is binding only on the
federal government,  except in cases where nonfederal action has been174
federalized by a partnership between local and federal governments.   This175
was not the situation here, and accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Kootenai held
that “because NEPA requires action only by the government, only the
government can be liable under NEPA.  Because a private party cannot violate
NEPA, it cannot be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action,”  and it is176
denied intervention of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).
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Despite the fact that the government conceded that there were problems
with the roadless rule and it was taking steps to remedy them, the Ninth Circuit
nonetheless allowed the defendant-interveners to pursue their appeal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b).   This decision is in stark177
contradiction with United States Supreme Court precedent established in
Diamond v. Charles, which held that “[b]ecause the State alone is entitled to
create a legal code, only the State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ . . . in
defending the standards embodied in that code.”   Not only that, but it178
appears that whatever standards the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure attempt
to place on permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), in the environmental
context, all that is required to meet Rule 24(b)(2)’s guideline that an
intervenor’s “claim or defense . . . share [] with the main action a common
question of law or fact”  is that defendant-intervenors assert “defenses . . .179
directly responsive to the claim[]” of the other party.180
The importance of this benefit provided by courts to interest groups cannot
be overstated.  If the roadless rule cases are indicators of any trends in
environmental interest group behavior, it is that intervention might become
one of the primary forms of group participation in the policy-making process.
For example, by the time Kootenai reached the Ninth Circuit, nine groups had
been granted status as defendant-intervenors.   The major benefit that these181
groups reap from the courts through intervenor status is the ability to act as a
“real” party; yet, because so many of the groups intervene at the same time,
they are able to spread the costs of litigation.  The phenomenon is still present
when environmental interest groups are in the plaintiff’s chair.  In California
ex rel. Lockyer v. USDA, 20 conservationist interest groups joined together in
bringing suit.   This practice is not merely a tool of conservationist182
groups—in Kootenai, nine different groups (which could be generally
classified as pro-development) intervened as plaintiffs.   This type of183
involvement begs the question whether the purpose and rationale for joinder
and intervention  are being realized in environmental cases, or instead184
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whether interest groups are permitted to use these techniques to overwhelm
their opponents by showing strength in numbers?
III. The Bureaucracy, Interest Groups, and the Roadless Rule
Since the days of Woodrow Wilson, it has long been thought that there is,185
or ought to be, a “politics/administration dichotomy.”   In other words, the186
elected branches of government (specifically Congress) should make political
decisions while bureaucrats only make decisions on how to implement (or
administer) those choices.   Bureaucrats, in this view, are to be impartial as187
they administer Congress’ decisions, or in Wilson’s words, “politics sets the
tasks for administration” but should not “manipulate its offices.”   The188
consequence, however, is an inflexible adherence to the rules.   Although this189
conception of bureaucracy has largely been rejected by political scientists,
most of whom acknowledge that administrators often must make highly
political choices,  questions remain, principally: How much discretion should190
unelected bureaucrats have?  Furthermore, can agencies be hijacked by (or in
the case of judicial iron triangles, collude with) other political actors in an
effort to achieve policy goals that could not be realized elsewhere in the
political process?  The former question will be addressed in the following
section, but the latter will be addressed here, as the roadless rule’s history
suggests that agencies, in this case the Forest Service, are excellent forums for
frustrated policymakers and stakeholders to pursue their goals when success
is unlikely or impossible elsewhere.
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193. Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).  
194. See Alexander Cockburn, Clinton Hugs Not Trees but Gore Campaign, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 21, 1999, at B11.
195. Clinton, supra note 10.
196. Documents from the Forest Service dating to the infancy of the rule suggest that late
2000 was the expected completion date.  See Letter from Mike Dombeck, Forest Service Chief,
to Forest Service Employees (Oct. 14, 1999) (on file with author).
197. Clinton, supra note 10.  In this speech of 2,178 words, President Clinton devoted 584
words (26.8 percent) to a discussion of Roosevelt and his importance to the conservation
movement.  Id.  Additionally, Clinton used the name “Roosevelt” 13 times.  Id.
A. Benefits Provided to Interest Groups by Agencies—An Accessible,
Efficient Forum
The major objection raised by critics of the roadless rule was that the Forest
Service, while engaged in grudging, pro forma compliance with NEPA’s
procedural requirements, violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the law in its
timeline for promulgating the rule.   The mad rush to complete the rule,191
according to critics, was an attempt by the Forest Service to grant a political
favor to an outgoing president, while building a strong environmental legacy
for itself and President Clinton.   The dissenting judge in the Kootenai192
decision went so far as to suggest that the roadless rule was promulgated in an
attempt to help Vice President Gore’s chances in the presidential election.193
This link was also noted by many of the rule’s opponents.   Interestingly,194
President Clinton’s own words offer some evidence for this position, though
it is by no means damning.  In his October 1999 speech announcing the
beginning of the rulemaking process, Clinton made an interesting choice of
words, calling the roadless rule the “latest step taken under the administration
of Vice President Gore and me,” which could be interpreted as an attempt to
link Gore to the rule  with the hope that it would help him in the 2000195
presidential elections.   Also, in most correspondence and speeches about the196
rule, there is an attempt to link this action with the past actions of President
Theodore Roosevelt, widely remembered for, among other things, establishing
the first national parks.   This attempt appears to have been successful to197
some degree with newspapers often remarking on the Roosevelt link in some
fashion.  The Anchorage Daily News, for example, quoted the president of the
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2001).
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F.3d 1207 (10th  Cir. 2005) (quoting Roadless Rule Admin. Record, Doc. 4580, at 30) (internal
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201. Kootenai, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 1245 n.23.
202. Dombeck, supra note 196.
203. 1 FOREST SERV., supra note 35, at 7.  
Wilderness Society who called the rule “the most significant land preservation
undertaking since Teddy Roosevelt built the national forest system.”198
Yet did President Clinton, various environmental interests, and the Forest
Service collude to promulgate the roadless rule by the end of his term, and in
the process violate the NEPA either in spirit or by the letter of the law?  The
evidence presented in the Wyoming decision (which among all of the roadless
rule decisions most heavily relied on the rule’s administrative record) suggests
that, at best, the Forest Service complied with NEPA pro forma, and at worst,
purposefully disregarded an act designed to encourage meaningful, open, and
public participation in the planning process and ensure that decisions are made
on an informed basis.
The information provided in the rulemaking process was altogether
unacceptable, according to most actors.   For instance, the Forest Service199
never provided detailed maps of the areas to be covered by the rule—the maps
were of a continental scale and, thus, “lack[ed] sufficient detail to be of help
in determining what specific roads and areas [we]re affected,” as the Wyoming
State Engineer’s Office noted.   The information provided in hundreds of200
meetings held at a local level also seems to have been inadequate.  In
Kootenai, a member of the Kootenai tribal council noted in an affidavit that the
“Forest Service District Ranger could not tell tribal representatives any
specific information regarding the impacts the President’s Roadless Initiative
would have on the rights of tribal members.”201
Besides inadequate information, the timeframe followed by the Forest
Service in promulgating the rule also appears arbitrary and capricious and
suggests an agency headed toward a predetermined result.  In a letter to
employees dated October 14, 1999, Forest Service Chief Mike Dombeck
explained that the rule was expected to be completed by late 2000.   In202
keeping to this time frame, the comment period for the draft EIS was a mere
sixty-nine days, despite the final statement being 700 pages.   While the203
regulations of NEPA require only a forty-five day comment period, this time
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period is strictly a minimum.   Several requests for extensions were received204
and the Forest Service turned them down, despite a tradition of liberally
granting extensions.   The Forest Service also turned down Wyoming’s (and205
all other states’) request to participate in the process with “cooperating agency
status” because the state “would want to work at too great of a ‘level of
detail.’”206
Finally, the EIS requirement of NEPA compels agencies to consider a range
of alternatives (including a “no-action alternative”).   In the roadless rule207
EIS, three action alternatives were considered, all of which banned road
construction and reconstruction, the difference being in the amount of other
activities to be allowed in the affected areas.   Even the no-action alternative,208
if it were accepted, would still ban road building, as the interim roadless rule
would still be in effect.   No alternatives were considered that allowed for209
any degree of road building beyond that to prevent imminent catastrophe
because it would create an “unmanageably large number of alternatives.”210
This was the case despite the fact that several other possible alternatives could
have been considered that would have prevented degradation to roadless areas
without an outright ban on road building.   Prior Ninth Circuit precedent had211
held “[t]he existence of a viable but unexamined alternative renders an [EIS]
inadequate.  An agency’s consideration of alternatives is adequate if it
considers an appropriate range of alternatives, even if it does not consider
every available alternative.”   The dissenting opinion in Kootenai suggests212
a few reasonable alternatives to describe the range considered by precedent,
such as limiting road density, limiting road construction materials, or limiting
use to low-emission vehicles.   Thus, according to one court’s opinion, by213
defining the scope of the project so narrowly, the Forest Service essentially
defined the rule into existence.214
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Given the scope of the rule, which affected two percent of the United
States’ land mass and more than a quarter of Forest Service land base, the
length of time for the entire process—about fifteen months—seems
insufficient, given that many other Forest Service projects of a much smaller
scale took years to complete.  For example, the 1997 revision of the Tongass
Land Management and Resource Plan, which was as controversial as the
roadless rule on a local level, took more than ten years to complete.   The215
rushed rulemaking process suggests an active partnership between certain
interest groups and the Forest Service to see the roadless rule completed, and
further, to see it completed at a politically relevant date.
B. Benefits Provided to Agencies by Interest Groups—Information and
Public Support
Though the executive branch exercises the greatest degree of control over
the administrative rulemaking process, interest groups also regularly attempt
to exert influence in a variety of ways.  In one study, 80 percent of the groups
surveyed said they participated in the rulemaking process.   Furthermore,216
these groups rated it as one of their most important activities; more than 75
percent felt it was equal to or more important than lobbying Congress.   The217
roadless rule experience provides a powerful example of this.  One
investigation found that, from 1998 through 2000, environmental groups spent
more than $10 million campaigning for the roadless rule.   Additionally, they218
spent almost $2 million of that amount in an effort to convince the Forest
Service to apply the rule to the Tongass National Forest.   This is striking219
when one considers that the timber industry gave only $6.5 million to
congressional candidates in the 2000 elections.   Thus, environmental groups220
spent more money campaigning for the adoption of an administrative rule than
an entire industry gave to candidates during a hotly contested national election
cycle.221
Another form of interest group participation in rulemaking is for a group to
rally its rank-and-file members to support the cause.  This method was taken
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to record-setting proportions during promulgation of the roadless rule, as the
Forest Service received more than one million comments.   Yet, to some222
extent this is evidence of nothing more than an attempt to turn the comment
process into a national referendum on the rule.   In the draft EIS comment223
period, 1,155,000 comments were received in some form.   Of these, about224
one million were postcards or form letters, while only 60,000 were original
letters.   Of all the comments, the content analysis team was able to find only225
2,450 unique comments.226
Despite this, some claimed that the public comments did have an impact on
the final rule.  One Forest Service official called the roadless rule public
participation process “the best of democracy in action.”   Forest Service227
Chief Dombeck asserted that public comment was directly responsible for
inclusion of the Tongass National Forest in the final rule, as it had been
exempt from the interim rule.   If true, this would suggest that public228
comment is indeed seen as a type of vote.  A director at the Wilderness Society
claimed that the rule was not predetermined, but rather that “President Clinton
[and Vice President Gore?] got the ball moving with the roadless rule” and
would have backed off if not for the magnitude of the public comments in
favor of the rule.229
Using the public comment period as a kind of national referendum on
environmental policy is particularly inappropriate for a democratic society.
Most of those who comment on proposed rules find themselves at one extreme
or the other in terms of their attitudes toward the rule.   This can be seen230
simply by looking to the origin of the comments—most were received from
members of environmental conservation groups, in the form of postcards and
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form letters.   This approach presents two major problems for an agency231
attempting to discern the concerns and opinions of the public.  First, it creates
a skewed view of public opinion, one that is probably not in accord with the
positions of society at large.  Second, it defeats the purpose behind requiring
agencies to solicit public comments.  Comments were intended to be a means
of identifying issues and concerns that the agency failed to address or
addressed inadequately in its preliminary analysis of the proposed action.
Furthermore, it suggests that nationwide, “popular” comments are given far
greater weight than even those of local policymakers in affected areas.  This
once again is problematic in that many of the areas most affected by the rule
are sparsely populated rural areas.  For example, the governor of Alaska, the
state legislature, several state legislators, and eight local governments all
submitted letters and/or resolutions in support of exempting the Tongass from
the rule;  yet, even if everyone living in Alaska were to have submitted a232
comment in favor of exemption for the Tongass, those comments would only
equal a little more than half of those submitted by postcard or form letter.233
Thus, the roadless rule example lends strong support for the existence of the
judicial iron triangle in environmental policy—by rallying their members,
interest groups were able to grant the Forest Service and its rule the appearance
of strong public support.
IV. The Courts, the Bureaucracy, and the Roadless Rule
The relationship between the courts and administrative agencies is perhaps
the most tenuous among the three sides of a judicial iron triangle.  While
courts are often highly deferential to agency decisions, there is still a feeling
in many agencies that judicial review of their decisions only promotes delay
and inefficiency.  There may be more to this claim than just agency bitterness
towards the “new way” of doing things.  Several studies have revealed that
agencies are unusually difficult to defeat in litigation—generally finding that
agencies are successful in 70 to 75 percent of their cases before the United
States Supreme Court.   One Forest Service study found that in a five year234
period, the agency was successful in 62 out of 80 NEPA lawsuits brought
against it.   Yet because of the constant fear of litigation, the Forest Service235
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and other agencies spend vast resources “bullet proofing” their projects.  A
1999 report found that planning and assessment consumed about 40 percent
of the work at the Forest Service’s national level,  which equaled236
approximately $250 million, or 20 percent of the Forest Service’s annual
budget at the time.   One telling example cited by the Forest Service is that237
of a fire recovery project in the Bitterroot National Forest, which covered
approximately 80,000 acres.   Forest Service employees spent 15,000 person-238
days planning the project, with costs exceeding $1 million—$100,000 of
which was spent on printing and mailing costs.   Despite this, courts and239
agencies do have significant benefits to offer each other, and as the roadless
rule cases illustrate, the relationship persists in environmental policymaking.
A. Benefits the Courts Provide Agencies—Discretion and Deference
The chief benefit courts have to offer administrative agencies is deference.
Deference comes in two forms, the first being deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its mission.  In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council,  the United States Supreme Court ruled that “if the statute is silent240
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on permissible construction of the
statute.”   Furthermore, the standard of review imposed by courts in statutory241
interpretation cases is the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.
This standard is taken from the APA section 706, and is perhaps one of the
most deferential standards in administrative law.   One widespread example242
of judicial deference in environmental law is the generally consistent refusal
of federal courts to recognize any substantive requirements in NEPA’s
declaration of policy, found in section 101 of the Act.  This reached its apex
in Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,  which held that agencies243
are “not constrained by NEPA from deciding that other values outweigh the
environmental costs . . . NEPA merely prohibits uninformed—rather than
unwise—agency action.”244
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The second type of deference granted to administrative agencies by the
courts is deference to the expertise of agencies in complex, technical decisions.
The approach of the federal courts, and specifically the United States Supreme
Court, to NEPA is again instructive.  In the 1975 decision Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, the Court noted that “[n]either [NEPA] nor its legislative history
contemplates that a Court should substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the environmental consequences of its actions.”   The Court went on to245
note that if NEPA’s procedural requirements are met, “[t]he only role for a
court is to insure that the agency has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental
consequences.”246
The roadless rule cases suggest that judicial deference to the substantive
aspects of agency decisions remains alive and well today.  In Kootenai, for
example, the majority was willing to interpret NEPA less stringently where the
underlying goal of the project was to protect the environment.   Despite the247
fact that this assertion was based on nothing more than the majority’s political
preferences (there is certainly no precedent even hinting at this), it has been
established as precedent in the Ninth Circuit and was cited by the Northern
District of California as one of the primary rationales for reinstating the
roadless rule, after enjoining the state petitions rule.   Even Judge Brimmer’s248
scathing opinion in the Wyoming decision represented a nod to the Forest
Service.  In that opinion, despite being critical of the Forest Service’s conduct
during the rulemaking process, he was still to some degree deferring to the
policy of the new Bush administration Forest Service that had refused to
appeal the other injunctions against the rule and had lightly defended the rule
before Brimmer’s court.249
B. Benefits Agencies Offer Courts—The Power of the Sword
In contrast, perhaps the main benefit agencies can confer on the courts is the
willingness to implement the courts’ unfavorable decisions.  As was noted by
Hamilton in the Federalist papers, courts lack “influence over either the sword
or the purse . . . and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments.”   Despite the inherent weaknesses the250
Founders saw in the judiciary, it has enjoyed unusual success in seeing its
decisions implemented by the administrative branch of government.  One
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study of United States Supreme Court decisions from 1953 to 1990 found that
agencies implemented policies in 92.7 percent of the cases in which they
lost.  251
The Forest Service’s response to the Ninth Circuit’s Kootenai decision
illustrates the effectiveness of the courts.  After the Kootenai decision was
released, the Forest Service proceeded with implementing the decision, despite
the fact that the agency, then under the direction of Bush administration
officials, had already disavowed the rule and was actively seeking to replace
it.  Until the fate of the rule had been settled, the Forest Service issued an
interim directive which essentially halted all logging in roadless areas for
eighteen months unless consent to harvest was granted by the Forest Service
Chief.252
V. Origins of Judicial Iron Triangles
Article IV, section three of the United States Constitution grants Congress
the “Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”253
While the nation was confined to the land east of the Appalachian Mountains,
this task was not difficult for Congress to manage.  However, as the nation
grew geographically and as the federal government took on more
responsibilities, this task simply became impossible to manage.  Thus,
Congress began to delegate some responsibility to administrative agencies, like
the Forest Service.   Furthermore, judges sought to “fill the void left” as a254
result of congressional delegation.   This served the practical purpose of255
shifting some of the burden of governance to others, who were better able to
write policy and possessed expert knowledge Congress could never have.
However, many have seen this as also serving the more troubling purpose of
allowing Congress to escape tough policy decisions by forcing them upon
unelected bureaucrats and judges.256
Thus, one can see the seeds of the development of judicial iron triangles
being sown.  Iron triangles of any type, also known in the literature as
“subgovernments” and “tripartite coalitions,”  depend on two things for their257
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development and survival.   The first is that the parties involved must be able258
to satisfy the needs of the other players.   The second, and perhaps most259
important, is that other political actors must acquiesce in governance by a
subgovernment.   If the activities of such an iron triangle become important260
to outsiders, then the nonplayers (i.e., Congress or the President), have
incentives to intervene in the subsystem and possibly break it up.261
One could argue that in the environmental policy-making arena traditional,
not judicial, iron triangles are really the governing subsystem.  One scholar,
for example, suggested such a system existed in environmental policy between
the Army Corps of Engineers, congressional committees and development
interests with regard to dam building.   The same scholar suggested the262
Forest Service, from an early time in its existence, engaged in a similar type
of system by seeking to serve the local elites  instead of following the motto263
of Gifford Pinchot, perhaps the father of the national forest system, that the
end goal of the Forest Service was to deliver “the greatest good [to] the
greatest number in the long run.”264
It may indeed be true that traditional iron triangles dominated much of the
nation’s early environmental law.  However, with the rise of the modern
environmental movement in the 1970s, the incentives arose for policymakers
to interject themselves into whatever subsystems might have then existed.
This movement and the congressional response to it probably disrupted the
subsystem as it then existed.  Yet, as conservationist groups became “insiders”
and as industry formed groups to counter the power the conservationist groups
had amassed, the incentive for Congress to intervene dissipated.   The265
environment lost political prominence, especially with the 1981 inauguration
of Ronald Reagan, who undoubtedly disdained the goals of the environmental
movement.   Additionally, the role individual members of Congress had in266
environmental policymaking decreased dramatically.  The roadless rule
illustrates the lack of any real power the legislative branch of the traditional
iron triangle had over the rule.  During the time the roadless rule was being
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developed, the three most influential congressional committees for natural
resources issues  were chaired by three Republican congressmen from267
Alaska,  all of whom fiercely opposed the rule  and possessed great power268 269
within Congress.  None of the three participated in the rulemaking process
other than submitting official comments and making a few public
statements.   With the departure of Congress from most environmental270
policymaking, a power vacuum was created, which was filled by the federal
judiciary.
This shift of responsibility from Congress to elsewhere was hardly
unintentional.  By writing statutes that are broad and vague, legislators are able
to appear responsive to the public’s demands.  Additionally, because the laws
are vague, most legislators are able to support them and thus escape casting a
potentially politically damaging “no” vote.   Environmental policy is home271
to some of the most vague laws ever written.  NEPA, for example, while
prescribing some procedural requirements, also contains a “Declaration of
National Environmental Policy,” which is merely a resolution on the
environment that provides no practical mandate for agencies.   For instance,272
one of the substantive goals of the NEPA is that agencies should “create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony.”   One could easily interpret this “harmony” as either careful,273
environmentally conscious development, or as keeping nature as it is with a
minimum of human intrusion.  Both interpretations are consistent with NEPA.
This vagueness is not a unique characteristic of NEPA.  Two of the other
most important forest management laws to come out of the environmental
movement of the 1970s, the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960
(MUSYA)  and the National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA),  are274 275
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also plagued with ambiguity.   This trend has several important276
consequences.  First, an agency turns to these acts for guidance in making
tough decisions and instead develops “a sort of administrative schizophrenia,
unable to identify or even recognize its mission.”   Additionally, this277
ambiguity has “allow[ed] interest groups to project their visions onto the
congressional mandates.”   One scholar has asserted that “ambiguity which278
once provided agencies necessary latitude before Congress . . . now inspire[s]
sophisticated western interest groups to challenge agency policy.”279
The most apparent effect of this delegation through ambiguity is that it has
drastically increased litigation.  Because environmental legislation is so vague,
an agency can simultaneously be complying with an act and violating it,
depending on who is interpreting the law’s text.  Consequently, groups only
need to find a judge (or a panel of judges) sympathetic with their position in
order to cause policy change.  One telling statistic is that from the time NEPA
was enacted in 1969 over 1,000 court cases have been brought under the
Act.   Thus, the very ambiguity that was meant to provide agencies the280
flexibility needed to enact highly technical and complex environmental rules
has now ensured that almost every action by a resource agency—like the
Forest Service—will be challenged by some kind of organized interest.
Additionally, delegation through ambiguity has forced judges to take the
lead role in holding the bureaucracy accountable.  Congress can now rely on
the judiciary to overturn unpopular agency decisions, without the political risk
of doing so itself.  The Executive can do likewise, and the roadless rule
provides a good example.  The Bush administration could have immediately
suspended implementation of the roadless rule and either done nothing further
or proceeded to develop a new rule (each of which would have required going
through the rulemaking process again, however).  Instead, the Bush
administration allowed the courts to overturn it, and only then, once it was
politically safe to reformulate the rule, was the state petitions rule
promulgated.  The revision was, in essence, court ordered.  The courts, then,
provided the Bush administration with a convenient excuse to use in response
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2008
838 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  61:801
281. See ROSEN, supra note 9.
282. For member list of the current Congress, visit each chamber’s website.  United States
House of Representatives, http://www.house.gov (last visited May 20, 2009).  United States
Senate, http://www.senate.gov (last visited May 20, 2009). 
283. See HICKOK & MCDOWELL, supra note 255, at 213.
284. For the current status of congressional efforts to codify the roadless rule, see The
Library of Congress, Thomas, Bills and Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c110:H.R.2516: (last visited May 20, 2009).
285. Id.  The bill introduced in the House was entitled the National Forest Roadless Area
Conservation Act of 2007 (H.R. 2516).  A few other attempts have been made to codify the
roadless rule as a statute since 2002, but all have died in committee.
286. See Gerald M. Pomper, The Presidential Election: The Ills of American Politics After
9/11, in THE ELECTIONS OF 2004 42, 54 (Michael Nelson ed., 2005).
to criticism—the state petitions rule was not an attempt to undo the policies of
the previous administration; rather, it was a proactive step to protect areas that
were not protected after the 2003 injunction against the roadless rule.
What this leads to is unaccountable environmental decision making.  While
the President and Congress possess numerous methods of holding bureaucrats
accountable,  there are fewer means to hold judges accountable, particularly281
in a Congress like the current one, even though one party holds a healthy
majority in both houses and the presidency.   The main weapon Congress282
possesses vis-à-vis the judiciary in regulatory law is to codify the disputed
action into statute.   Yet, given the makeup of the current Congress, it is283
unlikely that any legislation, either in favor of or opposed to the roadless rule,
could be enacted.  While the current Congress and President Obama seem to
view environmental issues as pressing, the law governing the National Forest
System appears to be a much less pressing view than, for example, global
warming and renewable energy.  It is further unlikely that much will be done
to reconsider the Forest Service’s decision-making process until the economic
concerns that dominate much of the political discourse of today are resolved.
In fact, when Congress finally acted in response to public outcry, neither of the
proposed bills made it out of committee; thus, once again, Congress was able
to escape accountability by refusing to give the bill a roll call vote.   This was284
despite the fact that the bill had a rather broad base of support, as the House
version had 150 cosponsors.285
What is most troubling is not that Congress is ineffective in controlling the
courts or the bureaucracy; rather, it is that the public cannot hold anyone
accountable electorally.  For instance, all of the judges involved in the roadless
rule cases were appointed by past presidents (though, it is doubtful that any
president ever will be held accountable for the judges he puts on the bench,
except during the nomination process).  Likewise, the environment was not an
important factor for voters in the last two presidential elections,  despite the286
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fact that in 2000, presidential candidate Al Gore had long been a champion of
environmental causes.   The disinterest of the electorate allows the parties of287
a judicial iron triangle to pursue their visions of environmental policy without
fearing recourse at the polls.  Similarly, the roadless rule and other examples
suggest that near the end of their presidencies, lame-duck presidents will resort
to last ditch efforts (i.e., executive orders and expedited rulemaking) to realize
otherwise impossible environmental policy goals,  once again leaving the288
public with no one to hold accountable.
VI. What Is to Be Done?
What, then, is to be done about this crisis of accountability in environmental
policy?  First, and most important, Congress needs to take back some of the
discretion that has been delegated to agencies.  Of course, not every issue is a
matter for congressional action, but the roadless rule is a prime example of an
issue that should have been settled legislatively, given the enormity of the
project.  Congress is more than capable of legislating in this area, as it has
passed laws regulating use of federal lands that are of a much greater level of
specificity than a potential roadless rule would be.  For example, in Alaska,
where the federal government owns approximately 60 percent of the land,289
Congress has passed two major pieces of legislation that directly addressed
agency management of federal lands.   The Tongass Timber Reform Act290 291
is especially notable as it sets a clear policy for Forest Service management of
the largest national forest in the system, such as defining where the Forest
Service may build roads,  providing strict management guidelines for specific292
parcels of land,  and enacting measures for protecting fisheries.293 294
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Likewise, environmental laws need to be written in a clearer and more
precise manner.  If agencies have a clear mandate, they will be in a better
position to resist political pressure from both the executive branch and interest
groups.   Unambiguous statutes will also have the effect of reducing295
litigation, and thus remove (or at least lessen) the role judges play in the policy
process.  If NEPA were to be amended so that it clearly explains when an
environmental impact statement is required and what is required to be in it, the
two leading grounds for NEPA suits would be resolved.   For example, the296
requirement that an agency “explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable
alternatives,” found in NEPA’s implementing regulations,  would be much297
more meaningful if “reasonable alternatives” was adequately defined and
explained.  Currently, this represents one of the most contentious provisions
of the statute because it is simply too easy for groups to find an unexamined
but plausible alternative, thereby rendering the entire NEPA process
insufficient.298
An additional step Congress could take would be to remove or limit the
ability of groups to pursue a cause of action for a NEPA violation.  Instead of
relying on the APA as a ground for bringing suit, NEPA could be amended to
specifically provide for citizen suits, but it should clearly identify and define
which violations constitute legally cognizable injuries.  As NEPA exists in its
current form, it is simply too vague to provide effective direction, which in
turn creates incentives for those who do not agree with agency decision
making to allege a NEPA violation over what amounts to little more than
trivial errors that had little, if any, effect on the actual decision made.  Despite
an implementing regulation that states “any trivial violation of these
regulations [should] not give rise to any independent cause of action,”  two299
examples of trivial violations are found in a great number of cases that
essentially assert the agency’s analysis was imperfect (in 1994 one study found
92 percent of NEPA challenges essentially concerned the sufficiency of the
NEPA documents prepared for the project).   The first common example,300
found in 70 percent of challenges to NEPA EISs, is that the analysis of
significant effects is deficient.   The other common claim is that the range of301
alternatives is inadequate, which is present in 45 percent of claims against
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NEPA documents.   Commonly, after losing a suit for one of these two302
reasons, the agency issues a supplemental EIS and then proceeds to reach the
same decision it did before, producing no tangible result except the
expenditure time and taxpayer money in defending a decision that would have
been inevitably reached anyway.
In the end, though, the onus lies with the public to bring change to
environmental policy.  Much of the gains in environmental policy seen in the
1970s were initiated by grassroots campaigns of concerned citizens.  For the
current judicial iron triangle dominating environmental policy to be disrupted
or eliminated, another grassroots-level movement must develop so that
Congress has a clear mandate for action.  However, as long as the public
continues to be largely apathetic to environmental issues, elected (and
unelected) officials will continue to act accordingly.  The public also must take
advantage of the opportunities it is provided to meaningfully participate in the
policy-making process.  While the level of participation in the creation of the
roadless rule is promising, signing one’s name on a form letter is little more
than the “fast food” version of political participation.  In the end, the solution
to the nation’s environmental problems lies in the solution to most problems
found in a democracy—a more informed and active citizenry.
VII. Conclusion
Despite traditional notions that judges and bureaucrats are impartial,
apolitical decisionmakers, numerous scholars have found instances of both
engaged in political decision making.  Perhaps nowhere is this more evident
than in environmental policy, as the case of the roadless rule suggests that
judges and bureaucrats, along with interest groups, work together to shape
policy, resulting in a new phenomenon: the judicial iron triangle.  This
phenomenon has developed largely because Congress has refused to make
tough policy decisions, choosing instead to enact ambiguous statutes that give
the public the impression that Congress is active in environmental regulation,
but in effect the statutes do little.  In practice, Congress’ actions amount to a
delegation of the tough decisions to those in the unelected spheres of
government.  The situation is not hopeless, however, a proactive Congress and,
especially, a general public more interested in environmental issues, would
help foster the development of a movement seeking to demand restoration of
accountability in environmental policy.
Christopher Cumings
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